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Abstract 
This paper is a reader-friendly introduction to Bayesian inference applied to psychological science. 
We begin by explaining the difference between frequentist and epistemic interpretations of 
probability that underpin respectively frequentist and Bayesian statistics. We use a concrete 
example – a student wondering whether s/he carries the virus statisticus malignum – to explain how 
both approaches are different one from another. We illustrate Bayesian inference with  intuitive 
examples, before introducing the mathematical framework. Different schools of thoughts and 
recommendations are discussed to illustrate how to use priors in Bayes Factor testing. We discuss 
how psychology could benefit from a greater reliance on Bayesian methods. Finally, we illustrate 
how to compute Bayes Factors analyses with real data and provide the R code.  
 
Key-words: Bayesian statistics, probability, Bayes Factor, statistical inference 
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There is Nothing Magical About Bayesian Statistics: 
An Introduction to Epistemic Probabilities in Data Analysis for Psychology Starters 
 
  For the past few years, matters such as the improvement of research practices, 
reproducibility of published findings and data analysis have been among the hottest topics in the 
mainstream psychological literature. In the ongoing debates, Bayesian statistics have often been 
advocated as a viable tool to supplement the existing practices (e.g., Benjamin et al., 2017; Johnson, 
2013; Lindsay, 2015; Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016). Bayesian statistics were introduced in 
psychology for the first time already decades ago (Edwards et al., 1963), yet it is only quite recently 
that they have inspired a wide interest across the academia. The recent proliferation of introductory 
texts (e.g., Etz & Vandekerckhove, 2018; Kruschke & Liddell, 2018a; Wagenmakers, Marsman et 
al., 2018) and special contributions highlighting the most recent developments (e.g., Hoijtink, & 
Chow, 2017; Mulder & Wagenmakers, 2016) testifies of a global trend toward an increase in 
interest in Bayesian methods across psychological science (van de Schoot et al., 2017). 
The present paper is intended for those who wish to begin their experience with Bayesian 
statistics and get a clear understanding of what they are about. By means of concrete examples and 
intuitive explanations, it offers a non-technical, reader-friendly introduction that guides the reader 
through the essential topics in the following, incremental way. We start with discussing the notion 
of probability (Section 1) from which the rationale of Bayesian inference derives (Section 2), and 
we illustrate it with several examples (Section 3). We then outline a formal presentation of Bayes’ 
Theorem (Section 4). After having discussed the issue of priors and current practical 
recommendations on how to specify them (Section 5), we discuss hypothesis testing with Bayes 
Factors (Section 6). The paper also seeks to provide some food for thought on how Bayesian 
statistics could improve analytical practices in psychology (Section 7). Finally, we present an 
example of Bayesian hypothesis testing based on real data from a social psychology research and 
include the corresponding R code (Section 8). For those who are already familiar with Bayesian 
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inference, this paper also offers a more in-depth introduction to Bayesian concepts and formulas, as 
well as an up-to-date literature review on the ongoing recommendations and practices.  
We also want to make clear what is not the purpose of this paper. Firstly, we do not intend 
to give an exhaustive account of Bayesian analyses. The article covers some approaches instead of 
others and we take care to mention complementary references whenever relevant. Secondly, we do 
not provide an extensive training on how to compute the analyses in  a statistical software. We 
mostly focus here on laying down the conceptual bases and we mention useful statistical programs 
and references to available manuals. That being said, we still show how to conduct an actual 
Bayesian analysis in the last section of the article.   
  Finally, we also wish to emphasize that the present paper does not have the vocation to 
criticize the classical, frequentist framework of p-values for the benefit of Bayesian statistics. 
Though some authors do espouse such an approach and advocate for a complete switch to Bayesian 
statistics (e.g., Kruschke & Liddell, 2018b; Wagenmakers, Marsman et al., 2018), here we focus on 
discovery rather than persuasion.1 With this respect, the present paper adopts an approach of 
comparative pedagogics: We first lay down the fundamentals of the classical, frequentist approach 
to data analysis so that readers can develop useful intuitions on how Bayesian inference differs from 
what psychologists are mostly used to with the p-values.  
1. Frequentist versus Epistemic Probabilities 
There are at least two ways to interpret what “probability” means. The key-step in 
understanding Bayesian statistics first requires making explicit their underlying epistemic2 
interpretation to probability, which is fundamentally different from the frequentist interpretation 
underpinning classical statistics. 
Frequentist probability 
The frequentist interpretation defines probability as a long-term frequency of occurrence of 
an event in a specific set of events (von Mises, 1957). Frequentist probabilities are said to be in the 
world. They refer to intrinsic characteristics of nature that can be assessed more or less accurately 
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via observation. For instance, let us assume that statisticus malignum is a rare virus that triggers a 
serious disease known as statisticophilia gravita. The symptoms of the disease, in its severest form, 
include compulsive reading of statistical textbooks and pathologic feelings of fruition when 
performing regression analyses in R. Let us further assume that some serious scholars estimated that 
in the population of psychology students across the globe, the virus is present in 1 out of 1000 
individuals. The frequentist probability of having the virus is then 1/1000 = .001. It can be obtained 
by computing the ratio between the number of actual occurrences of the event (i.e. carrying the 
virus) and the total number of possible occurrences of the event (i.e. being a psychology student), 
which in the long run would converge to .001. From the frequentist perspective, this probability is 
the frequency of carrying the virus in this specific reference class, namely the population of all 
psychology students. This means that if we randomly sample over and over again from this 
population, it would be expected that 1 out of 1000 students would have the virus, on average. 
Epistemic Probability 
The epistemic interpretation defines probability as a measure of degree of confidence 
(Jeffreys, 1961). Epistemic probabilities are said to be in the mind because they relate to states of 
knowledge and represent subjective degrees of belief. In other words, epistemic probabilities can be 
used to quantify the degree of uncertainty regarding the occurrence of an event or the truthfulness of 
a statement. Imagine yourself as a psychology student wondering whether you carry the virus 
statisticus malignum. Having read the epidemiological reports written by the serious scholars about 
the prevalence of the virus in your group of reference – that is, .001 – you feel relieved, at first. 
Then, you realize that you have always enjoyed your statistics classes and among various statistical 
software you came across, R is your favorite one. You believe that your odds of having the virus are 
somewhat greater than you could expect based on the epidemiological reports. You are still pretty 
confident that most likely you do not carry the virus. You actually believe that there is a 5% chance 
of you being infected. Notice that here, the 5% is nothing but a belief. It quantifies your degree of 
uncertainty about having the virus, which is conceptually different from some objective frequency 
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of virus contamination within a reference class (here, the population of psychology students; see 
also Dienes, 2008, 2011). For the sake of illustration, the epistemic probability of 5% in this 
example is also numerically different from the frequentist probability of .001 mentioned above. 
Note however that modeling epistemic probabilities is not inconsistent with using frequentist 
probabilities as a starting point: you could have perfectly assumed that there was a .1% chance of 
you being infected (in line with the epidemiological reports), had you felt it represented accurately 
your state of knowledge. Using epistemic probabilities is fundamental to Bayesian statistics and, as 
we will later see, some proponents of Bayesian methods in fact stipulate that epistemic probabilities 
should be tuned to frequentist probabilities, whenever the latter are known. 
2. Frequentist versus Bayesian Statistics 
This section extends the previous one and discusses how each of the two interpretations of 
probability is determinant for each school of inferential statistics. The aim here is to compare both 
schools of inference, so that hopefully readers can grasp some useful intuitions about what Bayesian 
inference is and how it differs from the standard, frequentist approach to statistical inference (see 
Table 1 for a summary). For a more detailed account, we invite readers to read Dienes (2008, 2011), 
Kruschke and Liddell (2018b), Wagenmakers (2007) and Wagenmakers et al. (2008). 
Frequentist Statistics 
The classical statistics that psychologists use when they perform ordinary t-tests, ANOVAs, 
regression analyses, etc. rely on the frequentist interpretation of probability. As explained above, for 
frequentist probabilities to be meaningful, a specific set of events (i.e. a reference class) must be 
pre-specified. When one performs a statistical test that yields the usual p-value, the reference class 
refers to the sampling distribution under H0. For instance, when one obtains a p-value = .025 based 
on some data, then it means that such a set of data occurs with a maximal frequency of .025 under 
H0 in the long-run. Stated otherwise, if H0 were true, such data would only appear with a frequency 
of .025 if we were to repeat the same study over and over again, all other things being equal. The 
classical approach to statistical inference relies on such statements about frequencies – or 
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frequentist probabilities – of some data given some hypothesis. Specifically, in the Neyman-Pearson 
(NP) approach, one first specifies two statistical hypotheses about the investigated effect (H0 and 
H1), a sample size, and α and β levels that indicate rejection regions for each hypothesis based on 
cost-benefit trade-offs, before conducting the study3 (Gigerenzer et al., 2004; Lakens et al., 2018). 
After conducting the study, one then calculates the p-value: the probability of observing some sets 
of data at least as extreme as the actual set of data obtained in the study if it was run over and over 
again assuming H0 were true4. If p < α (conventionally α = .05, but see Lakens et al., 2018), then 
one rejects H0 and accepts H1. Thus, the level of significance α can be used as the error rate control 
in making wrong decisions of rejecting H0. Specifically, α refers to the relative frequency of Type-I 
errors (i.e. accepting H1 while H0 is true) in the long run of using this procedure. Here, the p-value 
is used only to take a yes-no decision: either to accept or reject a hypothesis. Since the p-value 
pertains to some possible sets of data that would be – but were not – obtained in the long run, 
frequentist inference does not depend stricto sensu on the observed data from a study. Instead, the 
frequentist inference uses probabilities to simulate possible outcomes based on the observed data in 
order to draw a generalization beyond the observed data, upon which a decision to accept or to 
reject a hypothesis is made.  
We illustrate the frequentist logic of the NP approach with the following example. Again, 
imagine that you are the psychology student and that you want to assess whether you carry the virus 
statisticus malignum or not. You decide to consult with Dr. Nikolaevich Golmorokov, a highly 
regarded Russian scholar in research on the virus. Dr. Golmorokov is also a sharp-minded 
statisticologist: he specializes in detecting the virus and has developed a highly accurate test to 
detect the presence of this virus in psychology students. Dr. Golmorokov developed the test as 
follows. He considered two hypotheses: H0: “The student does not carry the virus” and H1: “The 
student does carry the virus”. He assumed accepting H0 while H1 is true (Type II error) to be the 
costliest error, because leaving the virus unnoticed could lead to the contamination of the general 
population of students. He thought however that accepting H1 while H0 is true (Type I error) is not 
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so problematic, because treating the virus does not involve any substantial costs for patients. Thus, 
he designed his test to ensure high statistical power set at .99 (β = .01), and with an error rate of α = 
.10. In his office, the doctor explains the calibration of the test: the latter will miss the presence of 
the virus on average in one among a hundred of students who really carry the virus (Type II error) 
and that among a hundred of students who do not carry the virus, his test will falsely yield its 
presence in ten individuals, on average (Type I error). Having performed the test, the doctor gives 
you the results. It is positive, which indicates that you carry the virus. Without any time to waste, 
the doctor gives you the cure. He takes some red pill out of his pocket, asks you to swallow it, then 
accepts your payment of 99 CHF for the treatment, and finally sets you free to go, supposedly 
cured. 
Notice that in the example above, it was completely irrelevant whether the doctor believed 
or not if the student carried the virus. He only acted accordingly with the test result. The idea is that 
with α and β probability levels under control, the doctor can monitor the long-term frequency of 
wrong decisions. This example is meant to illustrate that the underlying frequentist approach to 
statistical inference answers the question “What should I do?”. The aim is to guide one’s behavior 
in dichotomous decision-making in rejection and acceptance of hypotheses while controlling the 
error rates committed by the repetition of this procedure in the long run. Consequently, everything 
that might alter this error rate in the long run – such as multiple comparisons, sampling intentions, 
post-hoc testing – must be taken into account if one seeks to keep α at the desired, fixed level 
(Wagenmakers, 2007; Wagenmakers et al., 2008). Notice that taking a decision means only to act 
accordingly, with no consequence whatsoever on believing whether the decision is right or wrong 
(Dienes, 2011). 
Bayesian Statistics 
 In contrast, Bayesian statistics rely on the epistemic interpretation of probability. In essence, 
epistemic probability is about quantifying uncertainty, and Bayesian statistics are about using 
uncertainty for inference. In this approach, one starts by formulating an initial belief about a 
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hypothesis of interest. This initial belief translates one’s uncertainty about the truthfulness of a 
hypothesis and is called the prior. Later sections will further describe Bayesian priors and discuss 
their choice in greater depth. At this stage, it suffices to say that the prior reflects one’s subjective 
state of knowledge – more or less precise – about some effect of interest that is available before 
conducting the study and collecting the data. As we will illustrate with the example below, the aim 
of Bayesian statistics is to use data in order to update the prior in the posterior. In other words, 
Bayesian statistics basically use data to update beliefs about the phenomenon of interest.  
For the last time, think yourself again as the psychology student wondering whether you 
carry the virus statisticus malignum. Even though the test by Dr. Golmorokov turned out to be 
positive, you would like to get an idea of the probability that you carry the virus. As you recall, your 
initial belief was that there was a 5% chance of you carrying the virus. You assign to the hypothesis 
𝐻: “I carry the virus” a prior 𝑝(𝐻) = .05, and this is your initial belief of this hypothesis being true. 
 However, you cannot ignore the fact that you consulted with Dr. Golmorokov and his test 
indicated that you carry the virus. You decide to use the knowledge of this data D (i.e. the positive 
test result) to learn something more about your chances of having the virus. In other words, you 
intend to use D in order to update your prior. You recall that the calibration of the test was as 
follows: (1) if you carry the virus, there is a 99% chance of the test being positive; (2) if you do not 
carry the virus, there is only a 10% chance of the test being positive. With this information in mind, 
you use Bayesian inference (which is illustrated more formally in Section 4), to calculate your 
probability of carrying the virus, given the fact that your result was positive. Abracadabra: you now 
know that there is a 0.3425606 probability of you carrying the virus, given that the test result was 
positive. Somewhat confused, you realize that you might have intuitively overestimated the 
probability of you carrying the virus because you tended to neglect how low your prior was in the 
first place (𝑝(𝐻) = .05) and relied only on the result given by the test. With this in mind, you now 
understand that, although the test diagnosed you as positive, there is still around a one-in-three 
chance of you actually having the virus5. 
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Notice that the probability 0.3425606 is the new epistemic probability of the hypothesis 𝐻 
that you actually carry the virus. This probability has been obtained based on the prior probability 
of the hypothesis 𝑝(𝐻) = .05, which has been then updated by the knowledge of data D. This is a 
conditional probability –  𝑝(𝐻|𝐷) = 0.3425606 – because now it refers to the probability of 𝐻 being 
true given the fact that the test result was positive (see also Appendix A and Section 4 for the 
detailed calculation). This probability is typically referred to as the posterior, since it is established 
a posteriori to knowing the data. Getting from prior to posterior probabilities of hypotheses by the 
means of data is the very kind of statistical inference one seeks to  perform within the Bayesian 
framework. 
The example described above aimed to illustrate that Bayesian statistics answer the question 
“How should I adjust my beliefs?”. The aim of Bayesian inference is adjusting one’s confidence – 
or uncertainty – in statistical hypotheses. Importantly, the rules of probability used in Bayesian 
inference that will be explained later imply that once the prior is set and data are known, there is 
only one way in which these two pieces of information combine together to get the posterior 
probability of a hypothesis. Importantly, this implies that Bayesian inference requires no 
adjustments for factors such as multiple testing, sampling intentions or post-hoc testing (Dienes, 
2011, 2016; Kruschke, 2014; Rouder, 2014). This is because, contrary to frequentist statistics, there 
is no reason to address the question of “what would happen in the long run if…”. Therefore, the 
posterior information remains unchanged regardless of , for example, how many other tests 
involving different hypotheses/priors were – or could have been – conducted, or regardless of how 
data was obtained (e.g., sequentially or not). However, this is also the reason why using Bayesian 
inference in decision making for research purposes will not allow controlling for the amount of 
wrong decisions made in the long run. The notion of long-term error rate is irrelevant in Bayesian 
statistics (Dienes, 2016) and therefore cannot be controlled for. This does not mean, however, that 
one cannot strategically use frequentist long-term error rates resulting from using Bayesian 
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inference in decisions to accept or reject hypotheses (Dienes, 2016; Schönbrodt & Wagenmakers, 
2017). 
 
[Insert Table 1 near here] 
 
3. Some Intuitive Examples of Bayesian Analyses 
 Before we get to the formal introduction to Bayesian statistics, we first present some easy 
but conceptually meaningful examples of Bayesian analyses. These are meant to help  
readers develop further intuitions about their underlying mechanics (see also van de Schoot et al., 
2014). Unlike in the previous section where the underlying parameter of interest was dichotomous 
(i.e. carrying or not carrying the virus), here we consider a more typical scenario where the 
parameter of interest is continuous. In the following examples, we illustrate how different priors can 
combine with the same data to result in different posteriors.   
Imagine a group of three undergraduate students who, as part of their research project, are 
interested in the link between the statisticophilia gravita disease and the introversion personality 
trait. They want to estimate the mean level of introversion in the population of psychology students 
diagnosed with the disease. They run the study together: they ask participants diagnosed with the 
disease to fill in a short questionnaire measuring introversion. In statistical terms, their parameter of 
interest – which we refer to as μ – is the mean score of introversion in this population, with μ = 0 
denoting the scale midpoint. They try to estimate the value of μ. Though they ran the study together, 
each of the three students had formulated a different prior before conducting the study and thus 
analyzed the data separately. Figure 1 displays their analyses (see Appendix B, for calculations). 
The data are portrayed by the likelihood function. The likelihood gives the conditional probability 
of obtaining the data given each considered value of μ. Figure 1 shows that the value of μ 
maximizing the probability of observing this set of data is μ = 4.5. 
 
AN INTRODUCTION TO BAYESIAN STATISTICS  12 
 
[Insert Figure 1 near here] 
 
Student 1 assumed μ to be positive: he hypothesized that psychology students with the 
disease would be highly introverted and would take more joy in socializing with statistical manuals 
rather than with their fellow students. Figure 1A illustrates his relatively informed prior. It uses a 
bell-shaped curve typical to a normal distribution centered on μ = 2. This means that the parameter 
is believed to be most likely positive, with values close to the mean being the most plausible a 
priori. Once the prior is updated in the posterior, the most probable parameter value given the data 
is μ = 3.4. Note that because a range of μ values were both probable under the prior and supported 
by the data, the belief in the truthfulness of these parameter values has strengthened in the posterior 
distribution of μ. Figure 1A shows that the Bayesian analysis maximized the posterior probability of 
those μ values that were congruent both with the specified prior and the likelihood function.   
Unlike Student 1, Student 2 did not hold any strong expectations regarding μ values before 
the study. Often researchers dispose of only little – if any – knowledge about the effect before 
running a study, and therefore cannot favour a specific hypothesis. From the Bayesian perspective, 
this also refers to a kind of knowledge to be integrated into the analysis. In such instances, weakly 
informed, vague or uninformed priors can be used. Figure 1B illustrates the choice of such a prior: it 
is an almost flat-shaped normal distribution centered on μ = 0 with a substantially greater variance 
than the prior used by Student 1. The prior from Figure 1B has considerably less precision than the 
prior from Figure 1A, meaning that the uncertainty of Student 2 is much higher than that of Student 
1. The prior’s precision is the inverse of its variance and illustrates the strength of the belief: the 
stronger the belief, the higher the precision and the lower the variance. With such a weakly 
informed prior as the one depicted in Figure 1B, the posterior is almost exclusively determined by 
the data. While the prior favored parameter values close to μ = 0 to a minor extent, the posterior 
now favors values centered on μ = 4.1. Once again, the intuitive nature of information integration 
under uncertainty is captured with Bayesian statistics: when there is only a glimpse of prior 
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knowledge available about a phenomenon, the resulting posterior is essentially determined by the 
likelihood function (that is, empirically). 
Finally, Student 3 assumed μ to be most likely null. Since the student held a very strong 
assumption about the value of this parameter, he used a highly informed prior (see Figure 1C). With 
such a strong allocation of prior probability, the data has only little impact on the posterior. In 
realistic situations, a prior that strong would have little reason to be used. If choosing such a highly 
informed prior was acceptable in a scientific community, using scarce research resources to conduct 
a study would be hardly justified. Otherwise, a prior that subjective could be simply deemed of 
limited interest. This example is merely presented for illustrative purposes to show another property 
of Bayesian analyses: with a strong prior allocation of probability in a hypothesis, much data is 
needed to exert a genuine impact and change the belief. 
These examples are meant to outline some basic principles of Bayesian inference. The take-
home message is that the posterior probability of a hypothesis is a coherent trade-off between the 
prior and the data, weighted by their respective precision. Bayesian inference is intuitively rational 
(Kruschke, 2014): strongly informed priors require much novel data to be changed, which is more 
easily achieved with weakly informed priors. We encourage readers to check Kristoffer 
Magnusson’s interactive app (http://rpsychologist.com/d3/bayes/) that illustrates the principles 
described here. 
For this pedagogical purpose, the choice of the prior was systematically arbitrary. It is only 
but a legitimate question to ask how one should proceed in real-life situations when choosing a 
prior. Specifying priors is certainly the most challenging, conceptually difficult and also frequently 
criticized part of Bayesian statistics. In Section 5, we introduce different schools of thoughts on 
how to choose the prior and on discussing what role it should play in data analysis. 
4. The Bayesian Approach to Statistical Inference 
Bayesian statistics rely on the assumption that it is possible to assign degrees of epistemic 
probability to scientific hypotheses (Dienes, 2008, 2011). Unlike in classical, frequentist statistics 
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where we assume hypotheses about statistical parameter values to be either true or false (e.g., “H0: μ 
= 0” is false and “H1: μ ≠ 0” is true), here we consider that hypotheses can be described as being 
more or less plausible or credible possibilities (Kruschke, 2014). Each possible hypothesis can be 
assigned to a certain level of epistemic probability that reflects the degree of confidence or belief 
one puts in the truthfulness of the given hypothesis. Bayesian statistics are all about updating this 
prior allocation of uncertainty across considered hypotheses by the means of data into a posterior 
allocation of uncertainty (Dienes, 2011; Kruschke, 2014; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014).  
The way the prior relates with the posterior is given by Bayes’ Theorem (Bayes & Price, 
1763; Laplace, 1814; see Appendix C, for derivation), which states that, for a hypothesis 𝐻 and a 
set of data D:  
                                                           𝑝(𝐻|𝐷) =  
𝑝(𝐷|𝐻) ×  𝑝(𝐻)
𝑝(𝐷)
.                                                      (1)  
 
This formula indicates how the prior probability of a hypothesis must be updated after getting to 
know data in order to get the posterior probability of the hypothesis being true. Specifically, the 
posterior probability of the hypothesis being true given data 𝑝(𝐻|𝐷) is given by likelihood 𝑝(𝐷|𝐻) 
times prior 𝑝(𝐻), divided by the probability of data 𝑝(𝐷) referred to as evidence, which is the 
literal transcription of Eq. (1). 
The likelihood 𝑝(𝐷|𝐻) refers to the conditional probability of the observed data, given the 
hypothesis. It is a mathematical function that indicates under which parameter values specified by 
the hypothesis the data are most likely to occur. All of the relevant information for the inference and 
the support that is provided by the data for a given hypothesis is captured by the likelihood function 
(Birnbaum, 1962, as cited in Dienes, 2011). Importantly, a hypothesis with the highest likelihood 
value is not necessarily the one with the highest probability of being true given the data: the 
likelihood 𝑝(𝐷|𝐻) should not be confused with the posterior probability 𝑝(𝐻|𝐷). The latter 
depends both on the likelihood and the prior. 
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 To illustrate the use of Bayes’ Theorem, we return to the  example of the psychology student 
assessing the chances of carrying the virus given that the test result was positive (see Figure 2). We 
assumed the prior for H1: “I carry the virus” such that 𝑝(𝐻1 ) = .05. Based on the information 
available on the test calibration, we use the rule of marginalization (see Appendix D) to calculate 
the probability of the evidence 𝑝(𝐷) necessary for calculations. Then, by applying Bayes’ Theorem, 
we determine that the probability of carrying the virus, given that the test was positive, is 0.3425606 
(see Figure 2). 
 
[Insert Figure 2 near here] 
 
Notice that in order to obtain the posterior 𝑝(𝐻1 |𝐷), we needed to calculate the probability 
of data 𝑝(𝐷). For real life situations involving continuous and multiple parameters, this element of 
the equation will be impossible to calculate.6 Moreover, performing Bayesian analyses will consist 
most of the time in comparing posterior probabilities of several hypotheses, rather than computing 
the exact value of a posterior for a given statistical hypothesis (as we did here merely for 
pedagogical purposes). Because all of these comparisons will rely on the same data, the value of 
𝑝(𝐷) stays unchanged: it is only a normalizing constant that can be safely omitted from analyses.7 
To sum up, the rationale of Bayesian statistics is quite straightforward: you start with an 
initial belief about a hypothesis on the effect at hand and use the data from your study to update this 
belief. Remarkably, this reasoning may seem quite natural as it mirrors some aspects of human 
reasoning in situations of uncertainty (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1975). Imagine you drive a car on a road 
you know well and find yourself unexpectedly in a traffic jam. You obviously do not know for sure 
why there is unusual traffic (uncertainty), yet you suspect that a car accident seems quite likely to 
have occurred (prior). Suddenly, you hear an alarm siren and see an upcoming ambulance (data). 
Because you know that ambulances are especially likely to appear when car accidents happen and 
you rarely see them otherwise (likelihood), the fact that you saw an ambulance has just strengthened 
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your prior belief that the traffic comes from a car accident (posterior). From the Bayesian 
perspective, updating personal beliefs in scientific hypotheses in the light of data is precisely the 
point of scientific inference (Dienes, 2008). The Bayesian framework can be relevant in research 
methodology because these “personal” prior beliefs may actually refer to previously accumulated 
scientific knowledge or reflect theoretically driven predictions about studied effects. The next 
section elaborates on this point. 
5. Specifying Bayesian Priors: On Some Intricacies of Subjectivity in Statistics 
A natural question that arises when discovering Bayesian statistics is: “How do I choose my 
prior?”. Specifying priors is undoubtedly one of the most challenging parts of Bayesian statistics, 
and might seem difficult at first glance. There are no unanimously shared rules on how to choose 
one’s prior. At least two schools of thoughts can be distinguished in this regard, namely subjective 
and objective Bayesian statistics (Berger, 2000, 2006; Goldstein, 2006; Sprenger, 2018). We 
espouse this distinction here because of its heuristic and pedagogical value, though we invite 
readers to keep in mind that it does not fully embody the complexity of disagreements and nuances 
between different Bayesian stances (e.g., Bandyopadhyay & Brittan, 2010; Berger, 2000, 2006; 
Gelman, 2008; 2011; Gelman & Shalizi, 2013; Goldstein, 2006; Williamson, 2010). After laying 
down the basic presumptions of each of the two schools, we will address the issue of subjectivity in 
Bayesian statistics. The section will end up with an articulation of the strengths of both objective 
and subjective approaches. 
Subjective Bayesian Statistics 
The subjective school uses priors to reflect personal beliefs about the studied phenomenon, 
and this subjectivity has a key role in data interpretation. Priors serve a descriptive function to 
model one’s initial assumptions about the problem, and Bayes’ Theorem is used to adjust these in 
the light of evidence (Goldstein, 2006). Subjective priors can be based on purely personal 
judgments and intuition (e.g., Howard et al., 2000). In this tradition, priors can also be calibrated 
based on frequentist probabilities if the latter are known (see Williamson, 2010), as we already 
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mentioned earlier. Priors can be also subjective in the sense that they are informed in a scientifically 
relevant way. Firstly, priors can be constructed with reference to past research that addressed 
similar questions, drawing from individual studies, literature reviews or meta-analyses. “Today’s 
posterior is tomorrow’s prior” (Lindley, 2000, p. 301). The rationale of subjective Bayesian 
statistics is consistent with the cumulative nature of science, where new research is always 
introduced with reference to past research. Such available knowledge can be accounted for in the 
Bayesian framework (Kruschke, 2014). Secondly, subjective priors can also represent predictions 
one makes from a theory (Dienes, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2016, 2019; Dienes & Mclatchie, 2018). Here, 
a prior is said to be “subjective” in the sense that it is a rational translation of a  theoretical 
prediction that is only possible via an informed scientific judgment. Dienes (2011, 2014, 2019; 
Dienes & Mclatchie, 2018) provided some useful guidelines on how to derive such theory-based 
priors, using uniform, normal and semi-normal distributions. Notice that for both these approaches, 
subjectively informed priors are not “capricious and idiosyncratic and covert, but instead […] based 
on publicly agreed facts or theories […] [and] must be admissible by a skeptical scientific 
audience” (Kruschke, 2014, pp. 114–115).  
Objective Bayesian Statistics 
It is considered in objective Bayesian statistics that priors should reflect as little assumptions 
as possible so as to limit their influence in data interpretation and remain as uncontroversial as 
possible (Berger, 2006). Instead of committing to beliefs or informed judgments, the objective 
approach to Bayesian inference often involves using pre-determined rules of thumbs when 
formulating priors that can be used in common situations. Objective Bayesian analyses thus refer to 
a set of conventional and default procedures to be used whenever subjectivity is not integrated into 
the analyses (Berger, 2006). In parameter estimation, it involves using vague priors that diffuse 
prior probability density over a wide range of parameter values. These priors exert virtually no 
impact on the posterior, which is essentially determined by data (Kruschke, 2014; Kruschke & 
Liddell, 2018a, 2018b; Figure 1B shows an example). In hypothesis testing, commonly used 
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objective priors are known as default priors. These classes of priors are meant to be either non-
informative in the sense that they limit the assumptions about the range of effect sizes (e.g., Rouder 
et al., 2009), or weakly-informed in the sense that some initial assumptions are necessary but still 
compatible with a large range of effect sizes and thus represent only diffuse prior knowledge (e.g., 
Rouder & Morey, 2012). A popular default prior is the JZS prior formulated by Rouder and 
colleagues (2009). It uses a Cauchy distribution8 centered on 0, which favors effect sizes closest to 
0, but still allocates reasonable amounts of prior probability to stronger effect sizes in each 
direction. This prior also uses a scale factor parameter r that specifies the range of expected effect 
sizes to be observed in data. The default value is set on r = .707, which means that 50% of expected 
standardized effect sizes falls within the [-.707, .707] interval. Recent research in Bayesian statistics 
has been marked by substantial efforts in the formulation of such priors that can serve as defaults in 
commonly used designs such as t-tests (Rouder et al., 2009; Wetzels et al., 2009), ANOVAs 
(Rouder et al., 2012; Wetzels et al., 2012), correlations (Wetzels & Wagenmakers, 2012) or 
multiple regressions (Liang et al., 2008; Rouder & Morey, 2012). The developments of such priors 
greatly mitigated the concerns raised by the use of priors based on idiosyncratic assumptions and 
made the Bayesian methods accessible for a variety of complex models. One may ask, however, 
what is the point of performing Bayesian analyses and struggle with epistemic probabilities if the 
goal is to limit their influence in data interpretation. Arguably, such methods offer an interesting 
trade-off: They allow making statements about probabilities of hypotheses and provide statistical 
evidence, while still mostly capitalizing on data. Finally, default priors are less time- and effort-
consuming to use, more widely accessible to a non-expert audience, easier to communicate, and 
may represent more compelling evidence to other researchers than subjectively informed priors 
(Berger, 2006; Wagenmakers, Marsman et al., 2018). 
A Brief Commentary on Subjectivity in Statistics 
We suspect that some of the readers raised in the frequentist tradition may find the objective 
approach to Bayesian analyses more appealing than the subjective one, supposedly because the 
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former falls closer to the standard of objectivity inherent to science. This issue points right at the 
heart of a major criticism of Bayesian statistics that has fueled a long-standing debate in the history 
of epistemology of science, namely its subjectivity (Gelman, 2008). In particular, it is often argued 
that Bayesian statistics – and especially the subjective approach we discussed above – lack 
concordant objectivity (e.g., Sprenger, 2018; Wagenmakers, Marsman et al., 2018). The objection 
essentially unfolds as follows: scientists using different priors to analyze their data may reach 
diverging conclusions while using the same dataset. Obviously, discussing the issue of subjectivity 
and objectivity in data analysis in depth is complex and falls outside the scope of the present paper 
(see Gelman & Hennig, 2017, for a recent account). Still, it is worth mentioning two arguments to 
address this recurrent criticism. Firstly, we will argue that both frequentist and Bayesian approaches 
actually involve some degrees of subjectivity – each of a different kind – to lay down a general 
argument that the notion of “objectivity” in data analysis is more of an illusion than a reality. 
Secondly, we will argue that subjectivity is a vital component in Bayesian methods without which a 
proper progress in psychological sciences could hardly take place. Before we begin, we emphasize 
that we do not wish to give a false impression that these are definite answers to the problem. This 
complex issue has no unique solution over which statisticians and philosophers alike would come to 
an agreement. Instead, approaching it ultimately leads to endorsing a particular epistemological 
tradition on how to do science. 
Bayesian school of inference has a well-established reputation of being a controversial 
approach to statistics, partly because of their subjectivity (e.g., Gelman, 2008, 2011; Sprenger, 
2018; Wagenmakers, Marsman, et al., 2018). The objection is generally grounded in a conviction 
that statistical analyses should be objective in order to warrant the objectivity of scientific 
conclusions and should be based on data and nothing else. Such a perception goes hand in hand 
with a belief that objectivity in data analysis is attainable through the frequentist approach with the 
p-values (e.g., Berger & Berry, 1988; Gelman, 2011), paired with an instinct to escape from 
subjectivity at any cost. After all, p-values can be obtained straightforwardly based on observed 
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data and the statistical model assuming the null hypothesis, irrespective of anyone’s idiosyncratic 
judgments and beliefs about the research question at hand. However, several authors have 
thoroughly illustrated that even the p-values are not exempt from subjective choices, such as 
researcher’s sampling and testing intentions (Berger & Berry, 1988, Dienes, 2008; Kruschke, 2014; 
Kruschke & Liddell, 2018b; Wagenmakers, 2007; Wagenmakers et al., 2008; Sprenger, 2018). For 
instance, assume that a particular data set of 100 participants yields a significant effect, say a p  
.03. Most likely, you implicitly assumed that the data set was collected with the following sampling 
and testing intentions: “1) collect 100 participants, then 2) compute the p-value”. However, the 
same data set could have been obtained with different sampling and testing intentions, such as “1) 
collect 50 participants, then 2) compute the p-value and if not significant, then 3) collect 50 other 
participants, then 4) compute the p-value. The latter scenario corresponds to a sequential analysis 
and would require dividing the α threshold by the total number of performed tests, in which case the 
p  .03 would no longer remain statistically significant at α/2 = .05/2 = .025. As a matter of fact, the 
same data set could have been obtained with a whole variety of different sampling and testing 
intentions that may eventually lead to opposite conclusions (see Dienes, 2008, Chapter 3; Kruschke 
& Liddell, 2018b; Wagenmakers, 2007, for a more detailed account of the issue; also see 
Wagenmakers et al., 2008, Section 2.3, for a humorous illustration). In the same example, the 
significance of the p-value may also be contingent on whether the test was one- or two-tailed, or 
whether it was predicted before or after the data was collected (e.g., Dienes, 2008; Sprenger, 2018). 
Such a dependency on subjective sampling and testing intentions thus leaves the door open for 
situations in which a single data set leads to different statistical conclusions, which is precisely the 
main criticism against Bayesian inference. Now, we hasten to emphasize that the word “subjective” 
must not be regarded as ungrounded; rather, it refers to an informed judgment that must be justified 
in the light of other available options. Making informed judgments in frequentist statistics is part of 
the routine and there is nothing unusual about it. When one uses the p-values, one is expected to 
conduct power analyses that require committing to an appropriate effect size, which must be 
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justified. Indeed, the choice of a suitable alternative to the null hypothesis in power analyses also 
requires to make an informed judgment. Finally, the choice of α thresholds in frequentist inference 
is also left to the researchers’ discretion. Researchers can use custom α thresholds in their work 
based on subjective cost-benefit considerations and are expected to justify their α (Lakens et al., 
2018). Let alone, the usual α threshold fixed at .05 used in most of psychology journals is arbitrary 
and can be more or less stringent depending on the discipline. Likewise, Bayesian inference can 
also involve thresholds – as we are about to discover in the next section – that are no less arbitrary 
and can vary across journals and scientific communities, without a straightforward theoretical 
justification.  
We insist that the point made here is not meant to undermine the validity of frequentist 
inference. Our point is that both Bayesian and frequentist approaches involve various degrees of 
subjectivity. While the latter is bound up with the choices such as the researcher’s intentions to 
collect and test data or effect size specification in power analyses, the former is bound up with the 
choice of priors. This leads us to the more general statement put forward by many acknowledged 
authors, that objectivity in data analysis is illusory (Berger & Berry, 1988; Gelman & Hennig, 
2017). The seemingly virtuous attitude of “letting the data speak” is simply incompatible with the 
wide variety of subjective choices that one needs to make in data analysis (Morey et al., 2016; 
Steegen et al., 2016; Silberzahn et al., 2018), such as model specification and building, 
measurement methods, data processing and construction (i.e. “cleaning”) or yet outlier 
management. Accordingly, Gelman and Hennig (2017) argued that the potentially misleading terms 
of “objective” and “subjective” should be abandoned and replaced by more meaningful attributes 
such as “transparent”, “consensual” or “context-dependent”. Suma sumarum, subjectivity – as long 
as it is understood as scientifically informed and publicly disclosed judgments rather than personal 
or idiosyncratic opinions – can be argued to be widely present across statistical practices and in 
science in general.  
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We now turn to our second argument: subjectivity may be regarded as a desirable feature 
and actually one of the strengths of Bayesian statistics. As we outlined earlier, there are good 
reasons to appreciate the pragmatical advantages of using the “objective” default priors. Default 
priors are particularly praised for their lack of subjective informativeness, minimal and neutral 
assumptions and for their wide adaptability as a default strategy to address various research 
questions (e.g., Berger, 2000). One of the reasons for their popularity is that they are designed to 
allow inferences to capitalize on data. However, learning from data is not equal to testing theory-
driven predictions, which is vital to the development of empirical sciences (e.g., Chalmers, 1982; 
Dienes, 2008). To bare on scientific progress, priors must reflect predictions that are theoretically 
meaningful. Theory-driven priors cannot be narrowed to mere default models since the latter will 
not yield substantive theoretical predictions (e.g., Dienes, 2014, 2019; Dienes & Mclatchie, 2018) 
nor can they simply summarize previously accumulated evidence (Krefeld-Schwalb et al., 2018). 
However, as Dienes (2016) points it out, formulating theory-driven priors is not a self-evident 
process: a theory will usually yield not one but several models that operationalize it. Firstly, 
because most psychological theories are not expressed with formal models but are stated in ordinary 
language (e.g., Fiske, 2004), which does not prompt unequivocal numerical predictions (Meehl, 
1967). Secondly, because a thought must be given to auxiliary assumptions under which we assume 
the theory to work (Earp & Trafimow, 2015; Świątkowski & Dompnier, 2017). All in all, 
translating a theory into specific priors requires ascertaining what the theory actually predicts but 
also many other aspects, such as quality and relevance of past research related to the theory at hand, 
reflecting upon the range of plausible effect sizes, the auxiliary assumptions, etc. All of these 
involve a great deal of informed scientific judgments in the process. This leads us to the core of our 
argument: the subjectivity inherent to the Bayesian framework is transparent and can be 
constructively discussed and debated within a research community (Dienes, 2019; Kruschke, 2014; 
Morey et al., 2016, Sprenger, 2018). For example, Sprenger (2018) argued that the subjective 
approach to Bayesian inference fosters constructive criticism and illustrated it in the case of psi 
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research. All controversy put aside, conflicting parties could work on their disagreements because 
they held different assumptions that were transparently translated into different priors. In this sense, 
the inherent subjectivity of Bayesian inference can be considered as its strength as it encourages to 
outline the assumptions laying behind the scientific debate as precisely and transparently as 
possible. 
Beyond Objective and Subjective: Specifying Informed Priors 
The arguments discussed above lead us to the take-home message of this subsection: the 
distinction between “subjective” and “objective” Bayesian statistics may be somewhat spurious 
with respect to scientific inference (Dienes, 2014; Morey, 2017). On the one hand, scientifically 
meaningful priors should be formulated in full transparency, in a way that can be defended against a 
skeptical research audience and that invites for constructive criticism (e.g., Kruschke, 2014; 
Sprenger, 2018). On the other hand, they should convey theoretically meaningful and concomitant 
predictions about hypothesized effects (e.g., Dienes, 2014, 2016, 2019; Morey et al., 2016). It 
seems to us that current recommendations broadly available in the psychological literature align 
well with these two constraints. For instance, those authors who advocate for defaults priors clearly 
underscore the importance of customizing such priors depending on the researchers’ background 
knowledge and research peculiarities (e.g., Morey, 2017; Rouder et al., 2009; Rouder et al., 2016; 
Wagenmakers, Marsman et al., 2018). Likewise, Dienes (2014) also stressed that his approach to 
Bayesian inference cannot be reduced to either of the two approaches – subjective or objective – 
which he put in an insightful way: 
 
“The approach is objective in that [it involves] rules of thumb that can act as 
(contextually relevant) defaults, where the probability distributions are specified in simple 
objective ways by reference to data or logical or mathematical relations inherent in the 
design. No example relied on anyone saying, “according to my intuition the mean should be 
two because that’s how I feel” (cf. Howard et al., 2000, for such priors). But the approach is 
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subjective in that […] only scientific judgment can determine the  right representation of the 
theory’s predictions given the theory and existing background knowledge; and that scientific 
judgment entails that all defaults are defeasible – because science is subject to the frame 
problem” (p.13) 
 
A first practical consequence that follows is that default priors scaled at arbitrary parameter 
values should not be used mechanistically in every possible situation, irrespective of the research 
context. Such an attitude would be unwarranted for sound inference (see Gigerenzer, 2004, for 
“statistical rituals”), neither is it actually advised by the tenants of default priors. Arguably, the 
degree to which researchers can appeal to their judgments in constructing their priors should depend 
on their advancement in their research program when studying a particular effect. This point holds 
to the fact that researchers accumulate knowledge as they conduct successive studies within a 
broader research program, and hence do not possess the same knowledge at its beginning than at 
more advanced stages of it. Therefore, an interesting possibility could be to start with a default prior 
at the beginning of a research and tune it up as the research advances. 
  As such, using the default JZS prior as a starting point to formulate one’s priors may seem 
appealing (see Dienes, 2014, 2019 and Dienes & Mclatchie, 2018, for alternative priors and useful 
strategies to construct them for hypothesis testing). First, the default JZS prior uses a Cauchy 
distribution and is centered on 0, so it assumes effect sizes close to 0 as the most plausible a priori. 
It is a conservative assumption for an alternative hypothesis that describes one’s expectations about 
the world when H0 is false. Also, recall that the default JZS is scaled at r = .707, so that 50% of the 
expected effect sizes falls within the [-.707, .707] range. Importantly, note that this default effect 
size range is arbitrary: it has no straightforward justification (Morey, 2017). While it may be well-
suited in those psychology subfields that are interested in substantial effect sizes, it is less so in 
domains that have interest in smaller effects, such as social psychology. With this respect, Morey 
(2017) urged for customizing the JZS prior instead of relying on the r = .707 default value. Ideally, 
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the JZS prior’s scale factor parameter should be adjusted to match the expected range of effect sizes 
typical to one’s research field, or otherwise to a theoretically justified range. For instance, 
considering the mean effect size in social psychological research of .21 in terms of correlation 
coefficient (Richard et al., 2003), equivalent to .43 in terms of Cohen’s d, researchers from this field 
may want to adjust the JZS prior’s r scale to .43 for standardized mean difference when performing 
a t-test (see also Williams et al., 2017). This would be a default starting point when no relevant 
knowledge is available, and no predictions can be made. With clear hypotheses in mind and at more 
advanced stages of research programs, a finer tailoring of the JZS prior becomes desirable. Strong 
hypotheses will usually specify the direction of an effect, and so such directional hypotheses can be 
tested with semi-Cauchy prior distributions (Morey, 2017; Morey & Rouder, 2011). With enough 
expert knowledge at hand, it is also possible to center Cauchy prior distributions around more 
theoretically meaningful mean parameter values than the null (see Gronau et al., 2019, for the 
informed Bayesian t-test). After all, if the theory at hand is not utterly wrong, a non-zero parameter 
value is more likely to be true. Keep in mind that such customizations of default priors warrant 
adequate justifications. Finally, it is also recommended to use several priors – ranging from the 
default to the very informed – to assess whether conclusions vary substantially across different 
choices in prior specification (i.e. robustness checks; see Dienes, 2019 and Wagenmakers, Love et 
al., 2018). 
Now that we reviewed some ways of choosing priors, we turn to discussing practical 
methods of the analyses. The next section introduces Bayesian hypothesis testing, discussing both 
theoretical underpinnings and practical ways of computation. 
6. Bayesian Hypothesis Testing: The Bayes Factor 
 Bayesian hypothesis testing involves computing Bayes Factors (Dienes, 2011, 2016; 
Jeffreys, 1961; Kass & Raftery, 1995; Kruschke, 2011; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014; Morey  et al., 
2016; Mulder & Wagenmakers, 2016; Rouder et al., 2009), which is the equivalent of frequentist 
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hypothesis testing. The Bayes Factor (BF) tests two hypotheses by comparing how much data are 
likely to have occurred under each (see Equation 3). It derives from Bayes’ Theorem as follows:  
 
                                                           
𝑝(𝐻1|𝐷)
𝑝(𝐻0|𝐷)
=  𝐵𝐹10  × 
𝑝(𝐻1)
𝑝(𝐻0)
,                                                      (2)  
 
     𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐵𝐹10 =  
𝑝(𝐷|𝐻1)
𝑝(𝐷|𝐻0)
                                                           (3)  
 
 
Equation (2) reads “Posterior odds equals Bayes Factor times Prior odds”. Prior odds 
indicate to what extent one favors one hypothesis over another before getting data. Posterior odds 
are an updated version of prior odds: they indicate how much more probable is hypothesis H1 than 
H0, given data at hand. Eq. (2) makes it clear that the BF gives the amount by which prior beliefs 
about hypotheses must be adjusted once data are known, to get the ratio of posterior probabilities of 
these hypotheses. Interpreting the BF value is very straightforward: for instance, a BF10 = 8 means 
that the observed data are 8 times more likely to have occurred under H1 (e.g., experimental 
hypothesis) than under H0 (e.g., null hypothesis). A BF10 = 1/5 is equivalent to BF01 = 5, meaning 
that data is 5 times better predicted by H0 than H1. For more computational details on how the BF is 
calculated, see Appendix E. 
 Importantly, note that the notion of “prior” has two distinct and independent meanings in 
Bayesian hypothesis testing (see Figure 3; see also Stefan & Schönbrodt, 2017). The first meaning 
refers to prior probability of a hypothesis, which simply quantifies the degree to which one believes 
the hypothesis to be true before seeing any data. A prior in this meaning, for instance the 𝑝(𝐻1) in 
Eq. (2), is used to calculate prior odds. The second meaning refers to prior probability of a model 
parameter 𝑝𝐻(𝜃): it is the distribution of probability over the range of values of a parameter 𝜃 as 
specified by the hypothesis 𝐻. In this sense, a prior can be understood as a model (Dienes, 2016, 
2019; Dienes & Mclatchie, 2018): it gives a statistical operationalization of what is actually 
predicted by a hypothesis and is used to calculate the evidence that data provide for the hypothesis 
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(Appendix E shows exactly how the prior intervenes in the computation of the likelihood term 
𝑝(𝐷|𝐻) ). The prior in this meaning is, for instance, the Cauchy distribution in the default JZS we 
discussed earlier. With its scale parameter set at r = .707, this prior distributes the probability of the 
parameter of interest – the standardized effect size  – so that one half of the expected effect sizes 
falls within the [-.707, .707] interval and the other half falls outside (see Rouder et al., 2009). In 
essence, the two meanings of “prior” refer to two independent questions in data analysis (Dienes, 
2014, 2016): the first meaning relates to the question “how much does one believe in a hypothesis 
before seeing the data”, while the second relates to the question “what does the hypothesis actually 
predict”. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 near here] 
 
 Furthermore, notice that in order to come up with posterior odds that indicate how probable 
is one hypothesis compared to another given data, one must necessarily commit to a ratio of prior 
odds and multiply it by the BF value. Although setting prior odds is entirely up to one’s personal 
beliefs (Dienes, 2008), it is suggested to conveniently set this ratio at 1 (e.g., Rouder et al., 2009), 
so that both hypotheses are equally probable before data are collected. Thus, with prior odds set at 
1, a BF10 = 8 is equivalent with saying that H1 is 8 times more likely than H0, given the data at hand. 
Although some proponents of the objective approach to Bayesian statistics would advocate for this 
practice, it still may be regarded as questionable. Specifically, setting the same prior probability to a 
point-hypothesis (e.g., the null hypothesis) and to an interval-hypothesis (e.g., the alternative) may 
be dubious. Keep in mind however that the BF can be interpreted on its own without any reference 
to prior odds. One can quantify the degree to which data support one hypothesis over another 
without having to state how much one believed in these hypotheses before seeing the data, as we 
discussed it in the paragraph above. The only prior information that must be specified then is the 
prior probability 𝑝𝐻(𝜃) that is necessary to compute the BF. Therefore, the BF can be interpreted as 
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a likelihood ratio that gives a measure of strength of evidence without having to specify the prior 
odds (see Dienes, 2014, 2016). 
The BF is advocated as being a conceptually simple, theoretically sound and coherent 
measure of evidence (Dienes, 2014, 2016; Lodewyckx et al., 2011; Morey et al., 2016). The BF 
compares the predictive accuracy of two competing hypotheses to explain data, hence it is a direct 
expression of relative strength of evidence for one hypothesis over another (Lodewyckx et al., 2011; 
Morey et al., 2016). The BF is a continuous measure of evidence from which three possible 
conclusions follow: (1) there is evidence for the alternative (H1) relative to the null (H0) when BF10 
> 1; (2) there is evidence for the null (H0) relative to the alternative (H1) when BF10 < 1; the data is 
insensitive to discriminate between the two hypotheses when BF10 ~ 1 (Dienes, 2014). According to 
a commonly used convention (see Table 2), the BF value must favor at least 3 times more one 
hypothesis over another for the evidence to be said “decisive”. For instance, a BF10 = 5 would be 
regarded as “substantial” evidence in favor of (H1) compared to (H0) according to this convention, 
whereas the evidence of BF10 = 2 would be merely regarded as “anecdotal”. Importantly however, 
some authors have raised concerns that such a categorization of continuous BF values into disc rete 
and arbitrary labels is neither useful nor desirable (Morey, 2015, 2017). Morey (2015) argued for 
instance that labels such as “anecdotal” or “substantial” to interpret BF values may inspire different 
interpretations across researchers, and “impose an  arbitrary, unjustified homogeneity on judgments 
of evidential strength”. On top of that, relying too heavily on these cutoffs entails the same risk as 
academia already experiences with the p < .05 threshold. For instance, a BF = 2.9 could be deemed 
insufficient to give grounds to publication, whereas a BF = 3.1 could be deemed high enough, 
though their evidential weights are quantitatively similar. 
 
[Insert Table 2 near here] 
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Since the BF tests two hypotheses simultaneously one against another, it is a symmetrical 
measure of evidence (Dienes, 2014, 2016; Dienes & Mclatchie, 2018). The BF can provide support 
either in favor of H1 against H0, or in favor of H0 against H1 (or indicate data insensitivity as 
mentioned above). When H1 is true, BF10 will converge to plus infinity as the sample size increases, 
and it will converge to 0 when H0 is true (Morey & Rouder, 2011). What follows is that the BF can 
be used to corroborate the null hypothesis (e.g., Dienes, 2014, 2016; Gallistel, 2009; Rouder et al., 
2009). Some authors raised concerns however that taken literally, the null hypothesis is always false 
(e.g., Cohen, 1994; Meehl, 1978), limiting the interest of providing evidence for such a point-null 
hypothesis. The BF can also provide evidence for interval null hypotheses, asserting approximate 
rather than exact invariances (Morey & Rouder, 2011). In any case, remember that the BF is a 
relative measure of evidence: it supports a hypothesis only relative to another. In other words, the 
BF cannot prove a hypothesis to be true in an absolute sense, but only indicate that this hypothesis 
accounts for data better than a competing one. For instance, imagine that your data indicate a very 
small correlation, say r = .03. With a reasonable sample size, a BF comparing the probability of 
such data under a model assuming the effect to be non-zero relative to a model assuming the effect 
to be zero would most likely yield support for the latter, say BF01 = 50. It is important to notice that 
such a BF value does not mean the null hypothesis is true, but rather that the data are more likely to 
occur under the null compared to a supposedly reasonably specified alternative (see also Rouder et 
al., 2009, Figure 5). 
For simple designs such as mean comparisons and when priors follow a (semi)normal 
distribution, BFs can be calculated analytically with online calculators (e.g., 
https://medstats.github.io/bayesfactor.html; also see Dienes, 2014). In more complex designs such 
as ANOVAs and multiple regression, computing BFs involve substantially greater computational 
difficulties, but they can be efficiently estimated by Savage-Dickey ratio using MCMC iterative 
methods (see Morey et al., 2011 and Wetzels et al., 2009, for more details). Among statistical 
programs computing BFs (Mulder & Wagenmakers, 2016), JASP (jasp-stats.org; JASP Team, 
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2016) and several R packages, including the BayesFactor (Morey & Rouder, 2015) or bayesmeta 
(Röver, 2020) may seem the most appealing for psychologists in daily needs, both multiplatform 
and freely available. JASP is a user-friendly software providing both frequentist and Bayesian 
features for most common models in psychology (e.g., ANOVA, linear regression, repeated 
measures). R users may use the BayesFactor package, covering mostly the same applications and 
allowing extra-flexibility typical for the software or bayesmeta for meta-analyses. Both JASP and 
BayesFactor perform omnibus and covariate tests (see Rouder & Morey, 2012). Importantly, 
remember that both JASP and BayesFactor are tuned to use the default JZS prior with default scales 
(e.g., r = .707 for the t-test). Though one can obtain BF values without having to explicitly specify 
the JZS r scale in JASP or BayesFactor, it is however of utmost importance not to rely on such 
default r scale values automatically, but rather to use priors that are meaningful with respect to the 
research context (see Section 5 and Rouder et al., 2009 for heuristics on how to specify the JZS 
scale). For detailed explanations on how to use JASP or BayesFactor package to compute BFs, we 
encourage readers to read the manuals (Morey & Rouder, 2015; Wagenmakers, Marsman et al., 
2018; Wagenmakers, Love et al., 2018). For some examples on how to report BF analyses, see 
Chatard et al. (2017) and Rouder and Morey (2012). 
 Some limitations of the BF must be mentioned. Remember that the BF measures the 
strength of evidence for one hypothesis with reference to another, thus the evidence is relational. 
Incautious hypothesis testing may yield an apparent support for a hypothesis (e.g., BF10 = 100), 
which in reality conceals the fact that both hypotheses are not well supported by data, only one 
more strongly than the other (e.g., BF10 = 0.0001 / 0.000001 = 100). Importantly, BFs are also 
limited with respect to their sensitivity to prior specification (e.g., Kruschke, 2014; Liu & Aitkin, 
2008; Rouder & Morey, 2012). Even BFs based on non-informative or weakly informative default 
priors do not fully address the concern about subjectivity, as BFs’ values may strongly depend on 
the choice of priors, even with large sample sizes. Robustness checks should therefore be regularly 
performed by checking whether the BF value changes substantially if alternative priors are used. 
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Lastly, computing BFs for covariate testing in multiple regressions may be limited when predictors 
are highly correlated (Rouder & Morey, 2012), just as in frequentist statistics. 
 At this point, readers should have enough understanding of the BF to bring us to the closing 
point. We turn back to the conceptual discussion on priors to emphasize the practical consequences 
of customizing the JZS prior. Here we present a series of simulations that illustrate how the choice 
of priors can impact the accuracy of decisions based on a particular BF analysis. We consider a 
common setup involving an independent two-sample Student t-test. For each simulation, we 
specified the following: the magnitude of population effect size, the scale factor parameter of the 
prior (i.e. JZS’ r) and the sample size. Effect sizes varied from 0 to 1 by steps of .10 in terms of 
Cohen’s d. We used two JZS priors: 1) a JZS prior scaled at r = .707, assuming a median effect size 
of .707 in absolute value used by the default in the software 2) a JZS prior scaled at r = .43, 
assuming a median effect size of .43 in absolute value and corresponding to the mean effect size in 
social psychology. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to the former as the “default prior” and to the 
latter as the “informed prior”. Finally, the simulations used several sample sizes, ranging from n=25 
to n=100. 
 Each simulation unfolded as follows. First, we drew a random sample of size n from two 
normally distributed populations, each parameterized according to the desired effect size. We then 
computed a BF10 with a Bayesian two-samples t-test on that data, using one of the two priors as the 
alternative to test against H0. If BF10 < 1/3, we decided to accept H0; If 1/3 ≤ BF10 < 3, we 
considered the test as inconclusive; if BF10 > 3, we decided to reject H0. Table 3 summarizes the 
results of repeating this procedure for an arbitrary high number of times. For comparative purposes 
and in line with our pedagogical approach, we also displayed statistical power proper to each 
scenario. The R code used to run the simulation is available online (https://osf.io/8x6kg). 
 
[Insert Table 3 near here] 
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 What we are most interested in here is the accuracy reached with small effect sizes 
depending on the prior. In domains like social psychology, small effect sizes are more usual than 
large effect sizes. The default prior assumed a medium/large median effect size. It was 
unreasonably large with respect to usual expectations of a social psychologist. Contrariwise, the 
informed prior assumed small effects to be more likely and it was meant to be more suitable. Note 
that overall, both priors performed roughly equally well for rejecting accurately H0 for non-zero 
effects. However, stronger expectations for medium/large effect sizes under the default prior came 
at a cost in accuracy with respect to making wrong decisions. For instance, for effects ranging from 
.20 to .40 Cohen’s d, the rate of wrong decisions to accept H0 oscillated between 48% to 16% for n 
= 50, when using the default prior. In this case, the informed prior performed much better: for the 
same range of effect sizes and sample size, the rate of wrong decisions to accept H0 was comprised 
between 17% and 4%. Now, where does this difference come from? Remember that a prior is an 
allocation of probability over the range of the possible values of a parameter. When the default prior 
assumes that that the median expected effect size is d = .707, it allocates 50% of its probability mass 
to effect sizes comprised between [-.707, .707]; the informed prior, on the other hand, allocates 50% 
of probability mass to effect sizes comprised between [-.43, .43]. In other words, the default prior 
spreads the probability mass to a greater extent for more extreme values and to a lesser extent for 
smaller values than the informed prior. If small effects are especially likely to be observed, then the 
corresponding likelihood will be more compatible with probability mass allocation under a 
narrower prior than under a wider prior. A narrower (informed) prior will be thus more competitive 
against the null hypothesis than a wider (default) prior. Consequently, BF values obtained with the 
former will be higher than those obtained with the latter. This in turn explains why the decisions 
based on the informed prior more often led to data insensitivity compared with the default prior. 
 Finally, notice the difference in accuracy obtained with this procedure when H0 was true. In 
this case, decisions based on the default prior led to higher accuracy relatively to the informed prior. 
For instance, with a small sample size (n = 25), using the informed prior literally never led to 
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correctly accepting the null hypothesis, whereas this rate was around 47% under the same 
conditions when the default prior was used. This illustrates another trade-off in prior customization: 
narrower priors will constitute more severe tests against the null hypothesis than wider priors. 
Stated differently, a narrower prior will be more competitive to account for random variations 
around the null than will be a wider prior.  
7. Bayes in Psychology: What Could Change? 
 In this section, we review how a greater reliance on Bayesian statistics could have non-
trivial consequences on virtually each step of the process of scientific inquiry, from theory 
construction to publication and replication. Rather than providing an exhaustive account of each 
increment, this section aims at highlighting some important consequences of using Bayesian 
inference. We thus encourage readers to check the references we mention below for further 
readings.  
Theory Development 
Formulating the Alternative Hypothesis. 
Arguably, among substantial consequences of a wider use of Bayesian statistics could be 
stronger theorizing in our field. Given that one must necessarily commit to a certain prior when 
performing Bayesian analyses, a thought must be given to what one actually expects (i.e. predicts) 
to find in data. In other words, Bayesian statistics force to explicitly state one’s hypotheses with 
respect to studied effects (see Dienes, 2016). Common criticisms toward NHST users object that the 
latter never commit to any alternative hypothesis and the only one being actually tested is H0, which 
often leads to rejecting it with only weak evidence (Rouder et al., 2016; Wetzels et al., 2011).  As 
we mentioned earlier, this is partly because most psychological theories are not mathematically 
precise enough to allow specifying an a priori alternative hypothesis as expected in the NP 
approach (Meehl, 1967). We hope to have illustrated throughout the paper that the Bayesian 
framework provides flexible ways in which priors can be formulated to reflect researcher’s 
expectations and hypotheses. On their road from exploration of effects to corroboration of theories, 
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the strength and the precision of researchers’ expectations and hypotheses vary substantially. To 
begin with, a possible application of Bayesian statistics could be in exploratory research. In this 
case, one ignores the exact number of statistical tests to be performed, hence testing intentions are 
not known a priori (De Groot, 2014). Relying on frequentist statistics may be dubious, both because 
no specific alternative hypothesis is specified, and because one does not control error rates. Here, a 
p < .05 hardly means what it is intended to mean, and chances are high that it might be a false 
positive especially when extensive multiple testing is applied, which is typical to exploration. 
Bayesian analyses seem more adequate because they preserve their meaning regardless of testing 
intentions. Moreover, researchers can use defaults priors (such as the JZS) and customize them so 
that they match the range of effect sizes of interest for exploration. On the other hand, closer to the 
“confirmatory” end of the spectrum, more subjective or informed versions of priors can be used. As 
researchers’ get experience with each study they conduct, their default priors can be flexibly shaped 
into more specific predictions, just as we discussed in Section 5. Building priors can be also based 
on the available literature (e.g., Dienes, 2019). This should be done with extra caution because of 
possible context dependency that could constitute some “hidden assumptions” of a theory (see 
Świątkowski & Dompnier, 2017). Stated differently, past research related to some effect of interest 
may exist, but it may turn out to be misleading, especially if it is produced within a specific culture 
or context.  
Theorizing and Assessing Invariances. 
Researchers can use Bayesian methods to corroborate H0 (Dienes, 2016; Gallistel, 2009; 
Rouder et al., 2009), which is not possible with conventional null hypothesis significance testing. 
Although one does not need to use Bayesian statistics per se to corroborate the null hypothesis (see 
Lakens, 2017, for frequentist equivalence testing), it is reasonable to expect that with the increased 
popularity of Bayesian statistics, an increased number of researchers would become less “aversive” 
against corroborating the null hypothesis. Establishing invariances can represent theoretical 
interests (e.g., Gallistel, 2009; Morey et al., 2018). Moreover, researchers often want to ensure that 
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variables such as sex or age exert no influence on dependent variables, or that such variables do not 
interact with experimental treatments. In such cases, corroborating H0 can be properly addressed 
with BFs instead of incorrectly with non-significant p-values. 
Methodology 
Sequential Analyses. 
Arguably, using Sequential Bayes Factors analyses (SBF; Schönbrodt & Wagenmakers, 
2017; Schönbrodt et al., 2017) could represent a major change for psychologists in the way they 
conduct their studies. Since Bayesian inference does not depend on sampling and testing intentions 
(i.e., multiple testing, collecting more data after initial testing; early data collection stopping), they 
allow a greater flexibility in research design than traditional methods. Here, one can monitor 
evidence throughout the process of data collection and stop it whenever it is deemed compelling 
enough. One can also collect more data once the planned sample size has been reached if the 
evidence is not informative enough. Both of these situations do not require to make any 
adjustments, as they would if one were to use frequentist statistics. Thus, SBF can be appealing 
because genuine a priori power analyses cannot always be performed, or they also may rely or 
inaccurate, overestimated effect sizes. SBF therefore guarantees that researchers do not end up with 
“non-significant” studies, and eventually be able to provide support either for H0 or for H1. 
Remember however that Bayesian statistics do not control for long term error rates. Using SBF for 
decisions to stop or continue data collection and testing should be performed very carefully if one 
still wishes to control error rates, which is possible with simulations (see Dienes, 2016 and 
Schönbrodt & Wagenmakers, 2017).  
Data analysis 
Intellectual Hygiene. 
According to some authors, many researchers are interested in knowing the probabilities of 
their hypotheses being true (e.g., Cohen, 1994; Gigerenzer et al., 2004). In this regard, Bayesian 
statistics seem naturally appealing, because they actually give what researchers look for when they 
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interpret p-values as a measure of falsehood of H0. Hence using Bayesian analyses would be a 
matter of intellectual hygiene. However, we also think that if the Bayesian framework were to 
become widely recognized in the field next to traditional methods, researchers would be more prone 
to acknowledge the important difference between the two conditional probabilities that are often 
conflated (e.g., Badenes-Ribera et al., 2016), namely the probability of some data given some 
hypothesis (e.g., a p-value) and the probability of some hypothesis given some data (e.g., a 
posterior). This would contribute to better statistical knowledge and education. 
Measuring Statistical Evidence. 
 As we hope to have explained it in Section 2, Bayesian statistics answer a radically 
different kind of statistical question than frequentist statistics. Instead of using p-values to know 
what decision about hypothesis acceptance or rejection to make based on some data, Bayesian 
statistics and specifically BFs can be used to assess the degree to which some data support one 
hypothesis over another. This approach allows to measure statistical evidence data provide for a 
hypothesis, because we can measure the degree to which a conviction in a hypothesis must be 
changed relative to another based on the data. This approach allows assessing the evidential value 
of data for a theory because the data are interpreted in a strict relationship with the theory (Dienes, 
2016; Morey et al., 2016). In practice, using BFs for decision making to accept hypotheses can 
sometimes lead to different conclusions than one would get using traditional statistics (see Dienes, 
2011; Johnson, 2013; Wetzels et al., 2011).  
No More “p > .05” Ambiguity. 
 Non-significant p-values are part of psychologists’ daily routine, yet they are hard to 
interpret. They occur for two reasons: (1) either because H0 is true; (2) or because data present too 
much variance and are insensitive to discriminate between H0 and H1. The p-value does not allow 
differentiating between these two situations, whereas the BF does. When BF10 is close to 1 this 
point toward data insensitivity, and when it is close to 0, it gives support for H0 over H1 (Dienes, 
2014). Remember that when H0 is true, the p-value does not converge to any specific value as the 
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sample size increases, whereas the BF10 converges to 0 (Morey & Rouder, 2011). Irrespective of 
one’s preferences for frequentist or Bayesian statistics, Dienes (2014; 2017) suggests computing 
BFs for non-significant p-values in order to disambiguate their meaning.  
Publication 
More Balanced Literature. 
 Dienes (2016) argued that since Bayesian statistics can provide evidence in favor of the null 
hypothesis over an alternative, there is no reason not to publish such evidence to track when data 
goes against a theory. This could likely contribute to a more balanced record of published literature 
between the “positive” and “negative” findings, hence possibly reducing the publication bias issue. 
Reduced QRPs. 
Let there be no illusion about it: as with every tool, it is possible to engage in questionable 
research practices (QRPs) with Bayesian statistics (e.g., using observed data to shape priors a 
posteriori; post-hoc covariate inclusion in a model to reach evidence, etc.). However, according to 
Dienes (2016), a wider reliance on Bayesian analyses could contribute to reducing the problem of 
QRPs. Since Bayesian statistics do not depend on factors such as sampling intentions (e.g., optional 
stopping, collecting more data after initial testing…) and multiple comparisons, these are ruled out 
from possible options to “hack” data. 
Replication 
Assessing Replication Research. 
Imagine you conduct a replication study of an effect with statistical power set at .95 , and 
you get a p = .21. Did you replicate or not? For the reasons mentioned above, a non-significant p-
value is hard to interpret in such cases, despite high statistical power (Dienes, 2016). As Dienes 
stated: “[…] knowing power alone is not enough; once the data are in, the obtained evidence needs 
to be assessed for how sensitively H0 is distinguished from H1” (2016, p. 80). In such cases, one 
could again rely on BF’s capacity to make the three-way distinction to assess whether data support 
H1, H0 or are just insensitive to make the difference. This view on data could provide a more 
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informative view on replication studies than a simple “replicated/not-replicated” dichotomy (see 
also Etz, & Vandekerckhove, 2016). 
8. Bayes Factors in Practice: A Commented Example with R Code 
This paper would not have been complete without a practical illustration. In the last section, 
we draw from a published research in social psychology to illustrate how to conduct an actual 
Bayesian analysis with Bayes Factors. We use the data from Chatard et al.’s (2017) research and 
show how to compute Bayes Factors using the BayesFactor R package. The annotated R code 
needed to reproduce the analyses is also available through the OSF website (https://osf.io/8x6kg). 
Chatard and colleagues' research (Chatard et al., 2017) addresses the question of 
automaticity in social comparison. The authors provide evidence that subliminal exposure (20 ms) 
to pictures of ultra-thin women is sufficient to increase body appearance anxiety. In the first part of 
their second experiment involving a within-subject design, female participants were subliminally 
exposed (vs. not exposed) to pictures of thin women while doing an unrelated task. Right after, they 
had to say how anxious they felt "right now" about their body and their weight. This constituted the 
main dependent variable of the experiment (coded “AnxietyPrime” and “AnxietyControl” in the R 
script). Then, participants were exposed a second time to a similar task and they were asked to 
guess whether a subliminal image was embedded in the task or not. The comparison between the 
"hits" (i.e. the picture was present and they saw it) and the "false alarms" (i.e. the picture was absent 
but they said it was present) served to check whether the exposure to the picture was indeed outside 
awareness. These two variables are coded as “Hits” and “FalseAlarms” in the R script. The authors 
tested two hypotheses.  
First, Chatard et al. sought to test whether the presentation of stimuli was outside 
participant’s consciousness. To this end, the authors compared participants’ false alarms with hits 
and predicted that the latter should not be higher than the former. A frequentist paired-samples t-test 
yielded a t(50) =  –0.43, p = .66, indicating that the two were not statistically significantly different. 
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Using the formula below, we computed a Bayesian paired-sample t-test that pits the null hypothesis 
against a default alternative hypothesis assuming a Cauchy prior scaled at r = .707: 
 
1 / ttestBF (Hits, FalseAlarms, paired = TRUE ,rscale  = .707) 
 
This analysis yielded a BF01 = 5.99 and means that the data were almost 6 times more likely under 
the null hypothesis than under a default alternative hypothesis. However, Chatard et al. used a more 
informed version of the Cauchy prior. They were specifically interested in testing an alternative 
directional hypothesis assuming that participants would have greater Hits than False Alarms. They 
thus used a semi-Cauchy prior scaled at the default value. We obtain the corresponding analysis 
with the following formula, by adding the “nullInterval” argument to the script and specifying that 
the Cauchy must be constrained to the positive side of the distribution:  
 
1 / ttestBF (Hits, FalseAlarms, paired = TRUE, nullInterval = c(0,+Inf), rscale  = .707)  
 
This analysis yielded a BF01 = 8.92 and means that their data were roughly 9 times more likely to 
occur under the null hypothesis than under the alternative hypothesis. It provides support to the 
claim that participants could not detect the presence of stimuli above chance level. Finally, Chatard 
et al. complemented their analyses with a robustness check to ensure that the same conclusion 
would follow if a narrower prior was used. Specifically, they further customized the JZS prior and 
used a one-side Cauchy scaled at r = .20:  
 
1 / ttestBF (Hits, FalseAlarms, paired = TRUE, nullInterval = c(0,+Inf), rscale  = .20)  
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The robustness check yields a BF01 = 3.03 that is consistent with the analyses obtained above. 
Using conventional cut-offs for decision-making (Jeffreys, 1961) would lead to accept the null 
hypothesis in spite of the alternatives for every prior that was used.  
Turning to the main analyses, Chatard et al. tested their experimental hypothesis assuming 
that participants would feel greater anxiety after being exposed to pictures with ultra-thin women 
(i.e. AnxietyPrime) than in the control condition (i.e. AnxietyControl). A frequentist paired-samples 
t-test, t(50) =  3.36, p = .001, indicated that the two variables were statistically significantly 
different. To start the Bayesian analysis, we can begin by computing a Bayesian paired-sample t-
test that tests an alternative hypothesis assuming a default Cauchy prior scaled at r = .43 against the 
null hypothesis: 
 
ttestBF (AnxietyPrime, AnxietyControl, paired = TRUE, rscale = .43)  
 
The output of this analysis is a BF10 = 22.59. If we used the default r = .707 scale, the 
corresponding analysis would yield a value of BF10 = 19.98. Yet again, to the extent that Chatard et 
al.’s experimental hypothesis assumed a specific direction of their effect, it is more relevant to 
custom the prior and use a semi-Cauchy distribution as displayed below:  
 
ttestBF (AnxietyPrime, AnxietyControl, paired=TRUE, nullInterval = c(0,+Inf), rscale = .707) 
 
With this formula, we obtain a BF10 = 39.93 in line with Chatard et al.’s results. We could also run 
additional robustness checks to see to what extent the results are sensible to prior specification. 
Scaling the JZS prior to semi-Cauchy distributions scaled at r = .43 and at r = .20 yielded BF10 = 
45.12 and BF10 = 38.07, respectively. Overall, the data provide substantial support to their 
hypothesis that a subliminal exposure to the thin ideal increases body appearance anxiety.  
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Conclusion 
The primary purpose of this article was to get across to the reader the understanding what 
Bayesian statistics are and how they can be applied in a relevant way for psychological research. 
We hope to have achieved this goal and to have demonstrated that there is really nothing magical 
about Bayesian statistics. They simply rely on a different interpretation of probability and answer 
different kinds of questions than those addressed in frequentist statistics. We further hope that the 
present content will successfully challenge some frequent controversies and clichés surrounding the 
use of Bayesian statistics, such that they would be too complex, subjective, or only to be used to 
publish “null” findings. We believe the provided examples illustrated how interpreting Bayesian 
statistics is straightforward and intuitive. Importantly, modern statistical programs have also made 
Bayesian statistics easy to compute. Furthermore, though the subjectivist approach to understand 
probability distributions as states of beliefs can be indeed debatable (Gelman, 2008), we have 
discussed several ways in which current recommendations for specifying Bayesian priors – such as 
the use of default JZS priors – mitigate usual concerns about how researcher’s subjectivity is 
involved in the analysis. Finally, we also hope that the article illustrated relevant ways of making 
psychological research benefit from using Bayesian statistics, beyond the sole possibility to 
corroborate the null hypothesis.  
Finally, it is also important to stress that our intention here was not to provide a universal 
tool for statistical inference (see Gigerenzer & Marewski, 2015). We believe that both frequentist 
and Bayesian statistics have their utility in psychological science and should be viewed as 
complementary, rather than mutually exclusive statistical tools (e.g., Bayarri & Berger, 2004; 
Krefeld-Schwalb et al., 2018; Witte & Zenker, 2017). With this respect, the APA guidelines state 
that “Researchers in the field of psychology use numerous approaches to the analysis of data, and 
no one approach is uniformly preferred as long as the method is appropriate to the research 
questions being asked and the nature of the data collected” (APA, 2010, p.33).  
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Footnotes 
1 None of the authors advocates for an exclusive use of frequentist or Bayesian statistics. 
Both advocate for sound statistical practices. 
2 Elsewhere in the psychological literature, epistemic probabilities are also referred to as 
subjective probabilities (e.g., Dienes, 2011) 
3 Though partially inspired by the NP approach, current practices for justifying scientific 
claims in psychology rely almost exclusively on the null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). 
Here, one rejects the statistical hypothesis of nonexistence of the effect under investigation (H0), if 
the probability of observing under this hypothesis one’s set of data or a more extreme set of data 
(the p-value) is smaller than the conventional threshold of .05. Despite the undisputed popularity in 
academia, this procedure has no straightforward theoretical justification (Gigerenzer, 2004; 
Gigerenzer et al., 2004). NHST in its most common use consists both in rejecting and accepting 
statistical hypotheses on the one hand, and providing evidence against the null hypothesis on the 
other. This reflects a hybrid logic of competing statistical theories of Neyman and Pearson (1933) 
and Fisher (1956), respectively (see Gigerenzer et al., 2004). A commonly endorsed practice in 
NHST, inspired by Fisher’s work, consists in computing p-values to reflect the falsehood of H0, 
where lower p-values indicate stronger evidence against H0 and allow being more confident that it 
is false, than higher p-values (see Wagenmakers et al., 2008, for why this is a less than an ideal way 
to quantify evidence against H0). This is a quasi-Bayesian approach to NHST (Gigerenzer, 1993) 
that conflicts with a strict frequentist approach to inference, because the level of significance serves, 
in practice, the same role as epistemic probabilities. This is not warranted within the framework that 
considers statistical hypotheses only as true or false, hence mentions like probable or improbable 
do not apply. 
4 Assuming the data are being collected with the same sampling intentions as the original 
study (see Wagenmakers et al., 2008). 
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5 It may seem counterintuitive that with a 99% chance of obtaining a positive test result 
when one does really carry the virus, the fact that the test was positive only makes the probability of 
carrying the virus still relatively as low as less than 35%. This is due to a relatively low prior 
probability for carrying the virus, namely 5% (see Bayes' Theorem application in Section 4). 
6 In many realistic applications, the exact value of 𝑝(𝐷) can be impossible to calculate due 
to computational difficulties (see Kruschke, 2014). This explains why Bayesian methods have been 
historically only seldom used. Scholars have known this approach to inference for centuries, yet 
only a limited subset of relatively simple models were mathematically solvable under Bayesian 
analyses (Kruschke, 2014). Without knowing 𝑝(𝐷), deriving the exact posterior probability 
distribution 𝑝(𝐻|𝐷) directly from Bayes’ Theorem is not possible. This is not a problem anymore, 
since recent developments in computational techniques known as Markov Chains Monte Carlo 
(MCMC; Gamerman & Lopes, 2006; Kruschke, 2014; Lunn et al., 2012; Rouder & Lu, 2005) 
extended the applicability of Bayesian statistics to a whole range of useful models for daily 
applications. Their usefulness relies on the fact that they allow to approximate posterior probability 
distributions without having to calculate 𝑝(𝐷). 
7 A simpler version of Bayes’ Theorem states that the posterior is proportional to likelihood 
times prior. 
8 A Cauchy distribution is a Student t distribution with 1 degree of freedom. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Definition of conditional probability 
For two events a and b, with p(b) > 0,  
𝑝(𝑎|𝑏) =  
𝑝(𝑎, 𝑏)
𝑝(𝑏)
 
The probability that will a happen given that b has occurred, is the probability of a 
and b happening together (i.e. joint probability), divided by the probability of b. 
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Appendix B. Formulas for calculating posterior normal distributions.  
The normal posterior distributions for Figures 1A, 1B and 1C can be conveniently 
computed with the following formulas for normal distributions (from Dienes, 2008, 
p.94), based on information about prior distributions and the likelihood provided 
below. 
 
Mean of prior = M0 
Mean of likelihood function = Md 
Standard-deviation of prior = SD0 
Standard-deviation of likelihood (standard-error of sample) = SE 
Precision or prior = c0 = 1/SD02 
Precision of likelihood = cd = 1/SE2 
Posterior precision = c1 = c0 + cd 
Posterior mean = M1 = (c0/c1) * M0 + (cd/c1) * Md 
Posterior standard-deviation = SD1 = square root(1/c1) 
 
For all figures: Mean of likelihood = 4.5, Standard-deviation of likelihood = 2.3 
Figure 1A: Mean of prior = 2, standard-deviation of prior = 2.7 
Figure 1B: Mean of prior = 0, standard-deviation of prior = 7 
Figure 1C: Mean of prior = 0, standard-deviation of prior = 1.08 
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Appendix C. Deriving the Bayes’ Theorem  
For two events a and b, we know that :  
𝑝(𝑎|𝑏) =  
𝑝(𝑎,𝑏)
𝑝(𝑏)
 → 𝑝(𝑎|𝑏)𝑝(𝑏) =  𝑝(𝑎, 𝑏) , for 𝑝(𝑏) > 0 
and alternatively,  
𝑝(𝑏|𝑎) =  
𝑝(𝑏,𝑎)
𝑝(𝑎)
 → 𝑝(𝑏|𝑎)𝑝(𝑎) =  𝑝(𝑏, 𝑎) , for 𝑝(𝑎)  > 0 
Since 𝑝(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑝(𝑏, 𝑎),  
𝑝(𝑎|𝑏)𝑝(𝑏) = 𝑝 (𝑏|𝑎)𝑝(𝑎)   
By dividing the last equation by 𝑝(𝑏), we get Bayes’ Theorem: 
𝒑(𝒂|𝒃) =
𝒑 (𝒃|𝒂)𝒑(𝒂)
𝒑(𝒃)
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Appendix D. Rule of marginalization  
For a set of data 𝐷 and a parameter 𝜃 we can deduce from axioms of probability that:  
𝑝(𝐷, 𝜃) =  𝑝(𝐷|𝜃)𝑝(𝜃) 
which means that the joint probability of 𝐷 and θ – 𝑝(𝐷, 𝜃) – equals the conditional 
probability of 𝐷 given θ – 𝑝(𝐷|𝐻)– times the probability of θ, 𝑝(𝜃). 
 
Then: 
- For a set of data D and a discrete-valued parameter θ, we know that:  
𝑝(𝐷) =  ∑ 𝑝(𝐷, 𝜃∗) =  ∑ 𝑝(𝐷|𝜃∗)𝑝(𝜃∗ )
𝜃∗𝜃∗
 
where θ* means that θ takes all possible values. This equation means that the 
probability of data can be expressed as function of (i.e. marginalized) the discrete 
values of θ. Specifically, the probability of data – 𝑝(𝐷) – is the sum for all values of θ 
of the products of the conditional probability of 𝐷 given θ – 𝑝(𝐷|𝐻) – and the 
probability of  θ, 𝑝(𝜃) .  
 
- For a set of data D and a continuous-valued parameter θ, we know that  
𝑝(𝐷) =  ∫ 𝑝(𝐷, 𝜃∗)𝑑𝜃∗ = ∫ 𝑝(𝐷|𝜃∗)𝑝(𝜃∗)𝑑𝜃∗  
where θ* means that θ takes all possible values. This equation means that the 
probability of data can be expressed as function of the continuous values of θ. 
Specifically, the probability of data – 𝑝(𝐷) – is the continuous sum (i.e. the integral ∫ 
) for all values of θ of the products of the conditional probability of 𝐷 given θ – 
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𝑝(𝐷|𝐻) – and the probability of  θ, 𝑝(𝜃). The symbol 𝑑𝜃∗ simply means that the 
integration (the summing) is being performed over the parameter θ. 
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Appendix E. Bayes Factor as a ratio of two marginal likelihoods. 
To get further insights on how the BF is calculated, it is necessary to consider what is 
actually predicted by each of the two tested hypotheses (see also Morey & Rouder, 2011, Rouder et 
al., 2009 and Stefan & Schönbrodt, 2017). Specifically, it is important to understand that each 
hypothesis can be given a concrete, statistical specification of what it actually predicts. In other 
words, a hypothesis can be operationalized by a model, which comprises a set of statistical 
parameters that appropriately describe the effect of interest. A model must specify the probability of 
observing some particular data given the model’s structure and parameter values – 𝑓𝐻 (𝐷|𝜃𝐻) – 
along with prior probabilities of these parameter values 𝑝𝐻(𝜃) (Kruschke, 2014). For instance, the 
hypothesis used by Student 1 assuming a non-null mean score on introversion scale in the 
population of students with the disease can be modeled with two parameters, μ and σ2, using a 
normal distribution to describe the data such that: y ~ N(μ,σ2), where y refers to individual scores on 
the scale. Also, Student 1 used a normal prior on the parameter μ, such that μ ~ N(δμ , σ2μ), and used 
arbitrary values for these priors, such that δμ = 2 and σ2μ = 2.72 . Since the prior 𝑝𝐻(𝜃) intervenes in 
the calculation of the likelihood 𝑝(𝐷|𝐻), the specification of this prior will have an important 
consequence on the likelihood value, and thus on the BF value. Thus, a proper specification of prior 
probability on parameter values 𝑝𝐻(𝜃) is essential for a BF analysis to be meaningful. This property 
is apparent if we use the rule of marginalization (see Appendix D), to re-express a Bayes Factor in 
the following way:   
                       𝐵𝐹10 =  
𝑝(𝐷|𝐻1)
𝑝(𝐷|𝐻0)
=
∫ 𝑓𝐻1(𝐷|𝜃1 )𝑝𝐻1 (𝜃1 )𝑑𝜃1
 
𝜃1∈𝛩𝐻1
∫ 𝑓𝐻0(𝐷|𝜃0)𝑝𝐻0 (𝜃0)𝑑𝜃0
 
𝜃0∈𝛩𝐻0
.                               (4) 
Equation (4) shows that the BF can be expressed as a ratio of marginal likelihoods 𝑝(𝐷|𝐻1 ) and 
𝑝(𝐷|𝐻0), which simply indicate how much the observed data 𝐷 are likely to occur under each 
hypothesis, 𝐻1 and 𝐻0, respectively. Eq. (4) further shows how these marginal likelihoods are 
obtained (Morey et al., 2011; Rouder et al., 2009; Wetzels et al., 2009). The term “marginal 
likelihood” implies specifically that the likelihoods 𝑓𝐻(𝐷|𝜃𝐻) will be averaged across all possible 
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values of θ (hence the integral ∫ to sum across the parameter space Θ) according to the density 
function 𝑓𝐻 of the data specified by the hypothesis H, weighted by their respective prior probability 
𝑝𝐻(𝜃) specified by the hypothesis H. For instance, the literal transcription of the right part of Eq. 
(4) for H1 could be then: “Across all values of parameters θ from the set of parameters defined by 
H1, compute the continuous sum of the conditional probabilities of the data given the value of θ 
according to the density function 𝑓𝐻  that are weighed by the prior probability accorded to the value 
of θ”. In sum, a marginal likelihood refers to the probability of some data given some hypothesis, 
and can be understood as the continuous average of likelihoods over all constituent point 
parameters, where priors serve as weights (Rouder et al., 2009). Importantly, Eq. (4) shows that the 
choice of prior 𝑝𝐻(𝜃) is determinant for the computation of marginal likelihood 𝑝(𝐷|𝐻). The fact 
that the likelihoods 𝑓𝐻 (𝐷|𝜃) are weighted by priors 𝑝𝐻(𝜃) across all parameter values procures 
desirable properties to BF (see Lodewyckx et al., 2011; Rouder et al., 2009; Wetzels et al., 2009, for 
more details). First, it ensures that BF operates according to the principle of parsimony in 
hypothesis testing (Jefferys & Berger, 1992; Myung & Pitt, 1997; Wetzels et al., 2009): when two 
statistical models specified by each hypothesis fit the data equally well, the simpler model is 
favored over the more complex one. This is because for the 𝑝(𝐷|𝐻) to be high, the hypothesis H 
must both be able to predict accurately the observed data and not predict another, different set of 
data. Crucially then, an unreasonably high allocation of prior probability to large values of θ will 
tend to lower the value of 𝑝(𝐷|𝐻), thus decreasing the degree to which the observed data D 
supports the hypothesis 𝐻 (Rouder et al., 2009).
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Tables
Table 1.  
Summary of some important differences between frequentist (Neyman-Pearson approach) and 
Bayesian statistics. 
 Frequentists statistics Bayesian statistics 
What is the aim in inference? 
Decision-making about 
accepting/rejecting 
statistical hypotheses 
Adjusting one’s confidence 
in statistical hypotheses 
What is the question answered? “What should I do?” 
“How should I adjust my 
beliefs?” 
Do condition on the actual data?  No Yes 
Do provide with evidence? No Yes 
Do control error rates? Yes No 
Sensitive to multiple testing? Yes No 
Sensitive to sampling rules? Yes No 
Sensitive to the time of prediction? Yes No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AN INTRODUCTION TO BAYESIAN STATISTICS
  65 
 
Table 2.  
Jeffrey’s (1961; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, & van der Maas, 2011) 
classification to interpret the values of Bayes Factor.  
 
Bayes Factor, BF10 Interpretation 
 > 100 Extreme evidence for H1* 
30 – 100 Very strong evidence for H1* 
10 – 30 Strong evidence for H1* 
3 – 10 Substantial evidence for H1* 
1 – 3 Anecdotal evidence for H1* 
 1  No evidence 
1/3 – 1 Anecdotal evidence for H0** 
1/10 – 1/3 Substantial evidence for H0** 
1/30 – 1/10 Strong evidence for H0** 
1/100 – 1/30 Very strong evidence for H0** 
 < 1/100 Extreme evidence for H0** 
Note. “*”: in comparison with H0; “**”: in comparison 
with H1. 
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Table 3.  
Summary of decision rates (percentages) for accepting and rejecting H0 and 
declaring data inconclusiveness based on simulated Bayes Factors values using a 
default (r = .707) and informed (r = .43) JZS prior through a Bayesian independent- 
    samples t-test. True population effect size (Cohen's d) 
    0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 
   Power 
0,05 0,06 0,11 0,18 0,28 0,41 0,55 0,68 0,79 0,88 0,93 
N  = 25/cell 
Default prior  
(r = .707) 
Accept H0  
0,47 0,45 0,39 0,29 0,20 0,12 0,07 0,03 0,01 0,01 0,00 
Inconclusive 0,52 0,52 0,57 0,62 0,65 0,62 0,56 0,45 0,33 0,21 0,14 
Reject H0 0,02 0,03 0,05 0,09 0,15 0,27 0,38 0,52 0,65 0,78 0,86 
 
 
           
Informed 
prior 
(r=.43) 
Accept H0 
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Inconclusive 0,98 0,97 0,95 0,90 0,84 0,73 0,61 0,48 0,33 0,23 0,13 
Reject H0 0,02 0,03 0,05 0,10 0,16 0,27 0,39 0,52 0,67 0,77 0,87 
   
 
           
   Power 
0,05 0,08 0,17 0,32 0,51 0,70 0,84 0,93 0,98 0,99 1,00 
N  = 50/cell 
Default prior  
(r = .707) 
Accept H0  0,69 0,63 0,48 0,31 0,16 0,07 0,02 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Inconclusive 0,29 0,34 0,44 0,51 0,52 0,41 0,27 0,15 0,06 0,02 0,00 
Reject H0 0,02 0,03 0,08 0,17 0,32 0,52 0,70 0,85 0,94 0,98 0,99 
 
 
           
Informed 
prior 
(r=.43) 
Accept H0  0,27 0,24 0,17 0,09 0,04 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Inconclusive 0,71 0,73 0,75 0,72 0,61 0,45 0,28 0,14 0,06 0,02 0,00 
Reject H0 0,02 0,04 0,09 0,19 0,35 0,54 0,72 0,86 0,94 0,98 1,00 
   
 
           
   
Power 0,05 0,09 0,23 0,45 0,68 0,86 0,95 0,99 1,00 1,00 1,00 
N = 75/cell 
Default prior  
(r = .707) 
Accept H0  0,76 0,68 0,47 0,25 0,10 0,03 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Inconclusive 0,23 0,29 0,42 0,49 0,41 0,25 0,12 0,04 0,01 0,00 0,00 
Reject H0 0,01 0,03 0,10 0,26 0,48 0,71 0,88 0,96 0,99 1,00 1,00 
 
 
           
Informed 
prior 
(r=.43) 
Accept H0  0,52 0,44 0,28 0,12 0,04 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Inconclusive 0,46 0,52 0,60 0,59 0,44 0,25 0,10 0,03 0,01 0,00 0,00 
Reject H0 0,02 0,04 0,12 0,29 0,52 0,75 0,90 0,97 0,99 
1,00 1,00 
    
           
  
 
Power 0,05 0,11 0,29 0,56 0,80 0,94 0,99 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
N = 100/cell 
Default prior  
(r = .707) 
Accept H0  0,80 0,69 0,44 0,20 0,06 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Inconclusive 0,19 0,27 0,42 0,45 0,32 0,15 0,04 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Reject H0 0,01 0,04 0,14 0,34 0,62 0,84 0,96 0,99 1,00 1,00 1,00 
 
 
           
Informed 
prior 
(r=.43) 
Accept H0  0,62 0,51 0,28 0,10 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Inconclusive 0,37 0,44 0,56 0,52 0,31 0,13 0,04 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Reject H0 0,02 0,05 0,16 0,38 0,66 0,86 0,96 0,99 1,00 1,00 1,00 
  Note. Each scenario was simulated 5000 times. Power levels correspond to a two-tailed test for alpha = .05 
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Figures 
Figure 1.  
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Figure 2. 
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Figure 3.  
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Three Bayesian analyses based on each student’s prior. 
Figure 2. Conditional probabilities for the test result given the presence of the virus 
and application of Bayes’ Theorem. 
Figure 3. The two meanings of the prior in Bayes Factor hypothesis testing. 
